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INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is a global problem without a global legal solution.  
Greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) accumulate in the atmosphere.  The 
atmosphere encompasses the globe, so it is nearly impossible to trace GHG 
emissions to their sources or to determine which sources cause a particular 
harm.  Moreover, it is difficult to allocate liability because the damage 
occurs beyond the boundaries of any individual court’s jurisdiction.  There 
is no global institution to provide oversight, and traditional international 
law methods, such as treaties, have produced unsatisfactory results.  As a 
result, injured parties increasingly turn to local courts.  Local courts, 
however, are limited by the scope of their judicial boundaries and must use 
existing doctrine to address climate change.  For example, courts cannot 
adjudicate claims unless plaintiffs have standing to bring a case.  In the 
United States, this means that plaintiffs have to prove injury, causation, and 
redressability.  Typically, local doctrines, including standing, were 
designed to ensure that localized issues are ripe for adjudication in a 
particular court, so they are not always adequate for or adaptable to global 
problems like climate change.  Nevertheless, courts must apply existing 
statutes, principles, and doctrines to climate change claims. 
As might be expected, courts struggle to apply standing doctrine to 
this global problem.  First, even if there is a colloquial injury,1 judges 
disagree on how to assess that injury given its global nature.  Second, given 
the difficult, if not impossible, task of linking particular injuries to 
particular emissions and the need for judicially manageable standards by 
which to assess that link, plaintiffs struggle to establish causation.  Third, 
courts must be able to provide redress, but, in the context of climate 
change, their power is limited to judicial review and statutory 
interpretation.  Since courts are not appropriate forums for setting emission 
standards, they provide redress by requiring agencies to take action or by 
holding agency decisions void. 
An analysis of how courts apply each element of local standing 
doctrine in the context of climate change demonstrates how local courts 
address global problems.  In many cases, the local doctrines cannot 
 
 1.  i.e., an injury in a practical rather than a legal sense. 
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accommodate global problems, and, as a result, potential cases are barred 
from judicial review.  Yet, in other cases, local courts can adapt the 
doctrinal requirements to address global problems, accommodating certain 
claims and certain actors.  When such adaptation is possible, a local court 
can become part of the global solution. 
Assessing the doctrinal bounds of local courts when it comes to global 
problems like climate change also raises larger questions on the 
functionality, legitimacy, and capacity of local courts.  Existing doctrines 
should ensure that, when courts address global problems, they are 
functionally appropriate, legitimate, and capable of adjudicating those 
global problems and becoming part of the solution. 
Part I will explore the depths of climate change and what makes it a 
global problem.  Part II will use the doctrine of standing to determine the 
circumstances under which local courts can address climate change.  In this 
analysis, isolating the components of standing—injury, causation, and 
redressability—demonstrates the unique ways in which climate change 
complicates standing and reveals how courts evaluate particular claims.  
Part III will address whether local courts can and ought to participate in 
solving a global problem like climate change.  In this way, standing 
doctrine will illuminate if, when, and how local courts address global 
problems and participate in the global solution. 
I. CLIMATE CHANGE AS A GLOBAL PROBLEM 
A. How is Climate Change a Global Problem? 
The climate change discussion centers on GHGs, which trap heat in 
the atmosphere and regulate the global climate.2  While GHGs exist 
naturally, human activities are adding increasing amounts of GHGs to the 
atmosphere—carbon dioxide in particular—by burning fossil fuels3 and 
clearing forests.4  Once in the atmosphere, GHGs work “like a blanket”: the 
more GHGs, the thicker the blanket, and the warmer the planet.5  
Consequently, an increase in GHG emissions leads to an increase in global 
temperature.  This increase significantly alters the global climate, often 
causing extreme and unpredictable weather.6  The source of the 
problematic emissions is not singular, it is impossible to disaggregate 
 
 2.  Causes of Climate Change, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, http://worldwildlife.org/threats/climate-
change (last visited Dec. 25, 2012). 
 3.  Such fossil fuels include coal, oil, and natural gas. 
 4.  Causes of Climate Change, supra note 2. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
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emissions because climate change only occurs after GHGs accumulate in 
the atmosphere, and the harmful effects of climate change are felt 
worldwide. Consequently, climate change is a global problem and any 
solution must also be global. 
One such solution seems to be lowering and regulating GHG 
emissions.  But without a single governing institution with the authority to 
implement such limits on total global GHGs, the problem evades a simple 
legal solution.  The atmosphere is a global commons: an indivisible and 
finite resource shared by all but not regulated by one omnipotent 
institution.7  While seeking to maximize their own gain, individuals and 
organizations emit increasing amounts of GHGs.  For example, individuals 
drive cars to accomplish daily activities and coal-mining companies mine, 
transport, and use coal before refining it and selling it to customers for 
profit.  These emission-causing activities have utility for each individual or 
organization.  For each individual, there is a high positive component: the 
benefit of or profit from those activities.  But there is also a small negative 
component: contribution of GHGs to the atmosphere.  When adding the 
component utilities of GHG emissions, the net result for each discrete 
emitter is positive because, individually, the positive component outweighs 
the negative component.  Accordingly, each individual has the incentive to 
continue to emit GHGs leading to misuse and overuse of the commons.  
Cumulatively, increased GHG emissions cause climate change, which 
results in climate change-related injuries.  In this situation, the freedom of 
the commons, or the lack of global GHG emission standards and limits, 
leads to ruin.  And, “[t]herein is the tragedy.”8  The destructive effects of 
increased GHG concentration in the atmosphere render climate change a 
global tragedy of the commons. 
Moreover, climate change is a global problem because it is neither 
international nor domestic; it concerns the world as a whole.9  Given that 
 
 7.  See, e.g., Marvin S. Soroos, Preserving the Atmosphere as a Global Commons, ENVTL. 
CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REP., Summer 2000, at 149, 149–50, available at 
www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Report6-9.pdf (discussing the atmosphere as a global commons 
and the lack of overarching law to regulate GHG impact on the atmosphere); see also Daniel W. 
Bromley & Jeffrey A. Cochrane, Understanding the Global Commons (Envtl. and Nat. Resources 
Training Project (EPAT/MUCIA), Working Paper No. 13, 1994), available at 
www.aae.wisc.edu/pubs/misc/docs/em13.pdf (noting that the atmosphere is part of the global 
commons). 
 8.  Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968), available at 
http://www.sciencemag.org/site/feature/misc/webfeat/sotp/pdfs/162-3859-1243.pdf. 
 9.  See Ralf Michaels, US Courts as World Courts 14 (Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper, 
2012) (“[W]orld events are events that concern the world as a whole; they are therefore more than just 
international events.”). 
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the 195 parties10 to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change11 “[a]cknowledg[e] that change in the Earth’s climate and its 
adverse effects are a common concern of humankind,”12 there seems to be a 
consensus that the problem is global.  Attempting to categorize climate 
change cases as either local or international, in which case the appropriate 
actors would be, respectively, local or international, is futile because 
“neither ‘domestic’ nor ‘international’ conveys fully the multiscalar 
character of [climate change].”13  More importantly, this global problem 
“transcends the relations between states and focuses also on non-
governmental actors and individuals,”14 inviting non-traditional actors to 
participate in addressing the problem.  The problem’s transcendence of 
national boundaries and traditional international actors raises concerns 
about how, where, and when to bring climate change claims.  As an 
inherently global problem, climate change defies solutions by local laws, 
international laws, or conflict of laws frameworks. 
Thus, climate change is a global problem not only because everyone is 
a culprit but also because there is no institution to regulate GHG emissions, 
allocate responsibility, and hold violators liable.  A global agency or global 
court with the explicit authority to implement a holistic solution does not 
exist.  Local actions to minimize destruction of finite resources by 
regulating and limiting GHG emissions are helpful in theory, but individual 
actions must always fail because one actor limiting GHGs does not 
necessarily result in a net decrease in GHG emissions.  Other actors may 
continue to emit GHGs at harmful levels, thereby negating the mitigation 
efforts of others.  Furthermore, a single local actor does not have a 
significant effect on a global problem because it is necessary to 
cumulatively lower GHG emissions below a global threshold.  To avert the 
tragedy, solutions cannot merely be local; they must be global. 
B. Non-existence of a Global Solution by Traditional International Actors 
Unfortunately, thus far, coordinated international efforts by traditional 
international actors have proven ineffective.  States, the most traditional 
 
 10.  First Steps to a Safer Future: Introducing the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/ 
essential_background/convention/items/6036.php (last visited Dec. 25, 2012). 
 11.  See infra Part I.B for a further discussion of this treaty. 
 12.  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change pmbl., done May 9, 1992, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107. 
 13.  Hari M. Osofsky, The Intersection of Scale, Science, and Law in Massachusetts v. EPA, in 
ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 129, 141 
(William C. G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009). 
 14.  Michaels, supra note 9, at 11. 
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international actors, have used conventional treaties to coordinate 
international efforts.15  The first of these treaties was the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”).  The UNFCCC 
entered into force in 1994 and, with 195 parties, currently has near-
universal membership.16  The treaty begins by invoking the concern that 
“human activities have been substantially increasing the atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases, that these increases enhance the 
natural greenhouse effect, and that this will result on average in an 
additional warming of the Earth’s surface and atmosphere and may 
adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind.”17  In response to this 
concern, the UNFCCC puts forth a global objective to mitigate climate 
change: “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system.”18  In its attempt to implement a coordinated solution, the 
treaty sets out commitments to reduce emission levels and establishes 
principles member nations ought to implement in their domestic policy.19 
While the treaty is binding, its use of verbs like “promote” and 
“cooperate” lends it a more symbolic character.20  For example, developed 
nations commit to “adopt national policies and take corresponding 
measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting . . . 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing 
[their] greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.”21  Committing to policies and 
taking measures to limit emissions does not necessarily mean that GHG 
emissions will drop below the threshold needed to mitigate climate change.  
Likewise, the parties’ pledge to “[t]ake climate change considerations into 
account, to the extent feasible, in their relevant social, economic and 
environmental policies and actions”22 does not mean taking climate change 
into account will be a primary concern.  Additionally, the caveat “to the 
extent feasible” is highly principled but does not establish clear regulations: 
 
 15.  See Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate Change, UNITED 
NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/ 
items/6031.php (last visited Dec. 25, 2012) (discussing the timeline of coordinated international 
efforts). 
 16.  First Steps to a Safer Future: Introducing The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, supra note 10. 
 17.  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 12. 
 18.  Id. art. 2. 
 19.  Id. art. 4. 
 20.  See, e.g., id. (obligating all parties to “promote sustainable management, and promote and 
cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs.”). 
 21.  Id. art. 4, ¶ 2(a). 
 22.  Id. art. 4, ¶ 1(f). 
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the level of consideration is left to the judgment of each nation and the 
chosen standard could be utilized to favor economic incentives in place of 
environmental ones.  As a result, this wording grants countries a great deal 
of liberty to address climate change to the extent they see fit. 
The initial emission reduction provisions of the UNFCCC proved 
inadequate, and in 1997, the parties negotiated the Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.  The Kyoto 
Protocol entered into force in 2005 and currently has 191 parties.23  Most 
significantly, the Kyoto Protocol uses more exigent language.  For instance, 
Article 3 states: 
 
  The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure 
that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions 
of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned 
amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and 
reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the 
provisions of this Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions 
of such gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment 
period 2008 to 2012.24 
 
In principle, the move towards more stringent commitments is a 
positive step because it suggests tighter regulation, which will hopefully 
mitigate climate change.  Moreover, the use of subsequent protocols, such 
as the Kyoto Protocol, rather than the negotiation of a new treaty, is 
theoretically useful in addressing collective action problems.25  Such 
protocols allow the principles of the original treaty to stand firm while 
details, such as emission standards and obligations, can be implemented 
based on the progress made under existing protocols. 
Although such treaty regimes are designed to address collective action 
problems,26 this mechanism has not yet proved effective.  Evidence 
 
 23.  Making Those First Steps Count: An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_ 
protocol/items/6034.php (lasted visited Dec. 25, 2012); Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, 
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/ 
status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2013). 
 24.  Kyoto Protocol to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3, ¶ 1, 
adopted Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 161. 
 25.  See Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1632 (2005) (“Protecting the 
earth’s ozone layer and reducing global warming are classic collaboration problems.”). 
 26.  See id. at 1632 n.137 (“In the ozone regime, iteration takes the form of a principal convention 
and a series of later protocols and revisions.  States use ratification of these tiered agreements as a 
signal of their adherence to particular levels of commitment, thus promoting more durable cooperation 
and higher levels of compliance.”). 
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indicates that responses to climate change at the level of international 
oversight have been and “will likely continue to be wholly inadequate to 
confront the looming threat of climate change.”27  This lack of progress by 
the traditional international actors using devices such as treaties and treaty 
regimes has led to “growing despair by many actors, including 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), state and local governments in the 
United States, and in many nations . . . .”28  Given this sentiment, 
concerned parties look to other means to address climate change. 
C. Turning to Local Actors: Local Governments and Local Courts 
In conjunction with the limited success of traditional international 
efforts, the role of local governments and local courts in global affairs is 
growing.  Subnational and national governments are implementing 
legislation pertaining to climate change and litigation is proceeding at the 
subnational, national, and international levels.  Not only do these multilevel 
actions underscore the ineffectiveness of traditional international 
mechanisms, they also demonstrate how climate change is a global problem 
that lacks global oversight and cannot be solved from just one level of 
regulation.29  Thus, local governments and local courts are becoming global 
actors.30 
On the subnational level, states, cities, and communities are 
addressing global climate change through legislation and regulation.  
District councils in New Zealand have tried to use their ability to control 
land use to mitigate climate change.31  For example, in Genesis Power Ltd. 
v Franklin District Council, the Franklin District Council rejected a wind 
farm application due to potential adverse environmental impacts.32  The 
Environment Court of New Zealand reversed the decision, but in its 
analysis of the case, the court addressed climate change by weighing the 
adverse impacts of climate change against the need for sustainable and 
 
 27.  William C. G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky, Overview: The Exigencies That Drive Potential 
Causes of Action for Climate Change, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND 
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 13, at 1, 1. 
 28.  Id. at 18. 
 29.  See id. at 20 (“[C]limate change is not a problem that can be addressed at only one level of 
governance.”). 
 30.  See Katherine Trisolini & Jonathan Zasloff, Cities, Land Use, and the Global Commons: 
Genesis and the Urban Politics of Climate Change, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, 
NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 13, at 72, 85 (discussing the obsolescence 
of the Westphalian system of nation-states and the increasing participation of local governments on an 
international level in response to globalization). 
 31.  See id. at 72–80 (discussing the Genesis Power case and the actions of local courts). 
 32.  [2005] NZEnvC 341 at para [3] Whiting J for the Court. 
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renewable energy.33  The use of this balancing test indicates an awareness 
of and a willingness to address climate change and demonstrates that local 
governments possess the power to do so.  And, when taken cumulatively, 
the decisions of local governments on land use can substantially affect 
GHG emissions.34  Meanwhile, in the United States, states retain the 
capacity to create and implement climate change legislation and 
initiatives.35  For instance, Minnesota enacted an “environmental 
externality reporting statute.”36  The statute requires utility companies to 
conduct and provide estimates on environmental costs of power 
generation.37  A commission considers these costs when they approve plans 
and issue permits.38  Finally, an administrative law judge oversees 
contested cases.39  The statute, however, lacks guidance on how to 
implement the requirements, how to weigh environmental concerns against 
other public concerns, and what kinds of environmental impacts are to be 
considered.40  Additionally, it has been called a “relatively weak 
regulation.”41  Much state regulation has been criticized as “weak or 
symbolic regulation that lacks regulatory bite”; yet, the existence of such 
regulations indicates an effort and a capacity to address a global problem 
from the local level.42 
On the national level, legislation requires national administrative 
agencies to address climate change.  For instance, in the United States, 
Congress issued a mandate to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
to set emission standards and to give Congress a “coordinated national 
policy on global climate change.”43  This mandate acknowledges the global 
nature of climate change and the urgent need for a solution.  Similarly, 
 
 33.  Trisolini & Zasloff, supra note 30, at 78. 
 34.  See id. at 73 (suggesting that, cumulatively, local land decisions can have a substantial impact 
on GHG emissions). 
 35.  Stephanie Stern, State Action as Political Voice in Climate Change Policy: A Case Study of 
the Minnesota Environmental Cost Valuation Regulation, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, 
NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 13, at 31, 46 (explaining that the states 
retain power to create climate change legislation and regulations because the United States did not ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol and the federal government was reluctant to enact national legislation in the early 
2000s). 
 36.  Id. at 32. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 34–35. 
 41.  Id. at 32. 
 42.  See id. at 46–47 (discussing the nuanced power of seemingly weak regulations). 
 43.  Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 1103(b), 101 Stat. 1407, 
1408–09. 
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Australian environmental legislation calls for Commonwealth involvement 
in the assessment and approval of an activity if a matter of national 
environmental significance is involved.44  Specifically, the Environmental 
Planning and Assessment Act (“EP&A Act”) requires the Director-General 
of the Department of Planning, when conducting an environmental 
assessment, to consider certain environmental principles, as defined in the 
Protection of the Environment Administration Act.45  These principles 
effectively require the Director-General to take the global nature of climate 
change into account.46 
Through the existence of these local (national and subnational) 
statutes and regulations, local legislators and administrators take on a 
global role.  Since their laws address a global problem, actions taken in 
compliance with these laws may have effects beyond their original 
jurisdiction.  The laws may have even been designed to have far-reaching 
effects.  For example, the goals of the U.S. policy on climate change 
include “identify[ing] technologies and activities to limit mankind’s 
adverse effect on the global climate by . . . stabilizing or reducing 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases over the long term . . . .”47  
The United States may not have control over the atmosphere, but it intends 
to have an impact on the atmosphere through national policy.  Likewise, 
Australian legislation specifically envisions the regulation of agency 
activities that are likely to have a significant environmental impact, even 
beyond Australian jurisdiction.48 
Subsequently, since the “traditional role accorded courts [is] to 
interpret the law,”49 when local laws are related to climate change and 
permit judicial review, domestic courts will interpret and enforce those 
laws.  Further, when appropriate plaintiffs bring viable claims, courts have 
both the capacity and duty to rule on those claims.  Courts have a vital role 
to play in implementing and enforcing the rule of law50 and, because of this 
 
 44.  Linda Pearson, Australia, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN ENVIRONMENTAL GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 321, 325 (Louis J. Kotzé & Alexander R. Paterson eds., 
2009). 
 45.  See Environmental Planning & Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) s 4 (defining “ecologically 
sustainable development” according to its description in the Protection of the Environment 
Administration Act). 
 46.  See Gray v Minister for Planning [2006] NSWLEC 720 (Unreported, Pain J, Nov. 27, 2006) 
¶¶ 101, 122, 134 (discussing the requirement to take ecologically sustainable development principles 
into account, particularly the precautionary principle and the principle of intergenerational equity). 
 47.  Global Climate Protection Act of 1987 § 1103(a)(3)(B). 
 48.  See Pearson, supra note 44, at 326 (discussing the breadth of the EPBC Act). 
 49.  Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548 (1969). 
 50.  See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 963 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
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role, they are uniquely capable of addressing climate change.  A recent 
statement from the South African Constitutional Court espouses the critical 
role of courts to “entrench and uphold . . . current endeavors to achieve 
sustainable environmental governance.”51  Moreover, institutions involved 
in “the judicial process at the national, regional and global levels[] are 
crucial partners for promoting compliance with, and the implementation 
and enforcement of, international and national environmental law.”52  If 
local courts can achieve this result, then they can truly address climate 
change as a global problem.  And, since traditional international efforts are 
“not advancing,” parties are increasingly turning to litigation in local 
courts.53  When local courts address this global problem, they become 
courts not for their traditional jurisdiction but for the global population and 
for the globe itself.54 
II. STANDING: ACCOMMODATING AND IMPEDING CLIMATE 
CHANGE LITIGATION 
A. Standing Doctrine: A Threshold Issue for Adjudication 
No matter how important the underlying problem of climate change 
may be, local courts cannot rule on the substantive aspects of claims if they 
do not have the jurisdictional authority to hear the case.55  Within legal 
systems, courts have principles and doctrines at their disposal to determine 
whether a particular plaintiff has a justiciable claim.  These doctrines serve 
as procedural hurdles, separating those claims suited for adjudication by 
courts from those that are not.  In the United States, for instance, Article III 
of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases and 
controversies in which the court can address “questions presented in an 
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution 
through the judicial process.”56  The claims that fulfill this Constitutional 
 
judgment) (explaining how the “Court’s broad holding will serve the public interest in enforcing 
obedience to the rule of law”). 
 51.  Louis J. Kotzé & Alexander Paterson, Preface to THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 44, at 23. 
 52.  Id. at 24. 
 53.  Brian J. Preston, Climate Change Litigation: A Conspectus, 5 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 3 
(2011) (suggesting that litigation is an attractive alternative path). 
 54.  See Michaels, supra note 9, at 16 (“Here, a world court is court for the world”). 
 55.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992) (discussing how the 
jurisdiction of the judiciary is limited to cases and controversies under the separation of powers doctrine 
and how standing doctrine identifies those cases that are appropriate for judicial review). 
 56.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 
(1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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constraint—those that involve suitable parties with appropriate timing, 
justiciable issues, and legal requests—are deemed to have judicial 
standing.57  Similarly, in Australia, to bring a suit, it is necessary to have 
standing, which “depends on the identity of the person [bringing the claim] 
and the nature of the proceedings.”58  Accordingly, standing is one of the 
most fundamental components of any climate change litigation.59 
In the U.S., under Article III standing doctrine, a plaintiff seeking 
federal jurisdiction has the burden of establishing: (1) concrete and 
particularized injury to a protected interest, (2) causation, meaning the 
injury can be traced to the actions of the defendant, and (3) redressability, 
such that the remedy sought from the court would mitigate, alleviate, 
remedy, or repair the injury.60  While the “harms . . . are serious and well 
recognized,”61 the nature of climate change makes meeting these criteria 
and thus proving Article III standing difficult for plaintiffs. 
This global problem affects the global population and climate, but 
specific plaintiffs and locations tend to incur a disproportionate amount of 
the harm.  For instance, coastal areas are particularly affected because 
warmer temperatures cause ice to melt, which causes coastal lands to 
disappear due to rising water levels. 62  Additionally, the increased intensity 
of storm surges threatens coastal areas with accelerated erosion or 
destruction.63  In the Alaskan village of Kivalina, for example, melting ice, 
coastal erosion, and storm surges caused so much harm that the town 
brought a suit against ExxonMobil and other oil, energy, and utility 
companies, claiming that the companies’ large volume of GHG emissions 
caused these climate change injuries.64  In another case, the state of 
Massachusetts brought a claim against the EPA, invoking the erosion of 
Massachusetts’s coastal lands as an injury caused by the EPA’s failure to 
 
 57.  See id. at 505 (stating the requirement that a petitioner have standing in order to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court under Article III). 
 58.  Brian J Preston, Chief Judge, Land & Env’t Court of N.S.W., Austl., Paper Presented to the 
Joint Seminar on Legality of Administrative Behaviours and Types of Adjudication: Standing to Sue at 
Common Law in Australia 2 (Apr. 11, 2006), available at http://www.lec.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/ 
agdbasev7wr/_assets/lec/m420301l721754/preston_standing%20to%20sue%20at%20common%20law
%20in%20australia.pdf. 
 59.  See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559–60 (1992)) (discussing the need to fulfill standing requirements). 
 60.  Id. (quoting Sprint Commc’n Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273 (2008)). 
 61.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521. 
 62.  Coastal Areas, Climate Change, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ 
climatechange/impacts-adaptation/coasts.html (last visited June 14, 2012). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  See 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (providing an example of climate change litigation involving a 
private defendant). 
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implement emission standards.65  These cases demonstrate that injured 
parties are going to court and seeking to legally link their climate change 
injuries to the increased GHG emissions of certain defendants or to the 
failure of agencies to implement required regulatory responses to climate 
change. 
But successfully proving injury, linking that injury to a particular 
cause, and then proving that the court can provide redress is no small task.  
Given the way climate change occurs, many claims will not meet or not fit 
standing requirements.  While standing criteria is not the same in all 
countries, using the U.S. requirements as a model enables a comparison to 
similar doctrinal hurdles in other jurisdictions and demonstrates how local 
courts address global problems. 
B. Components of Standing 
1. Injury 
The first component of standing is injury.  In the United States, to 
prove injury, plaintiffs must demonstrate “a concrete and particularized 
injury that is either actual or imminent.”66  This standard indicates that (1) 
the case is ripe for adjudication because the injury has happened or will 
happen in the near future if the court does not act and (2) the plaintiffs have 
been harmed or their rights have been violated.  Similarly, in Australia, 
plaintiffs must differentiate themselves from the greater public.67  In the 
case of climate change, even if there is a colloquial injury, such as 
uncharacteristically intense erosion, judges have disagreed on how to 
assess climate change injuries under standing doctrine. 
a. Injury as Defined by Common Law or Statutory Language 
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the State of Massachusetts, joined by other 
state and local governments and environmental organizations, challenged 
the EPA’s refusal to regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act.68  
The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to “prescribe . . . standards applicable 
to the emission of any air pollutant . . . [which] cause[s], or contribute[s] to, 
air pollution . . . anticipated to endanger public health . . . .”69  Thus, the 
U.S. Supreme Court faced a statutory interpretation question about whether 
 
 65.  See 549 U.S. 497 (providing an example of a climate change case involving a regulatory 
agency). 
 66.  Id. at 517. 
 67.  Preston, supra note 58, at 11. 
 68.  549 U.S. at 505. 
 69.  Id. at 528 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006)). 
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the EPA had the authority under the Clean Air Act to set standards on 
emissions and, if so, whether the EPA was required to set such standards.70 
If it resolved that such a requirement existed, the Court had to determine 
whether Massachusetts’ injuries were caused by EPA inaction in the face of 
climate change. 
First, the Court had to decide whether Massachusetts’ alleged injury 
met the criteria of U.S. standing doctrine.  In the circuit court opinion for 
Massachusetts v. EPA, Judge Tatel, dissenting, felt that the substantial 
probability that rising sea levels would “lead to serious loss of coastal 
property” qualified as particularized injury.71  Meanwhile, Judge Sentelle, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, believed that while the plaintiffs 
had alleged global warming harms humanity as a whole, they could not 
allege particularized injuries to themselves.72  The EPA put forth a similar 
argument before the Supreme Court, asserting that the way in which GHG 
emissions cause widespread harm creates an “insuperable jurisdictional 
obstacle” because it is impossible to assert personal injury.73 
Eventually, the Supreme Court had the final word.  The Court noted 
the globally detrimental effects of climate change74 but reasoned that, to 
meet the injury requirement, plaintiffs who are suffering from the harmful 
effects of climate change must still establish injury “in a concrete and 
personal way.”75  Given that climate change causes widespread harm, 
however, proving concrete and particular injury ends up being a potential 
barrier to adjudication.  The Court declared climate change risks, such as 
erosion from rising sea levels around the globe, are “widely shared.”76  But, 
relying on prior applications of standing doctrine, it held Massachusetts’s 
injury and its interests in alleviating such injury through litigation77 were 
not minimized simply because climate change harms are widely shared.  
Looking to Federal Election Commission v. Akins, the Court declared, 
“where a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found 
‘injury in fact.’”78 
 
 70.  Id. at 516 (“The parties’ dispute turns on the proper construction of a congressional statute.”). 
 71.  Id. at 515 (citing 415 F.3d 50, 65–66 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)). 
 72.  Id. at 514–15. 
 73.  Id. at 517. 
 74.  Id. at 521. 
 75.  Id. at 517 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)) (“While it does not matter how many persons have been injured by the challenged action, 
the party bringing suit must show that the action injures him in a concrete and personal way.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 76.  Id. at 522 (quoting FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. (quoting 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998)). 
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court distinguished the global nature of 
climate change from particular injuries resulting from climate change.  The 
specific injury in Massachusetts v. EPA resulted from the rising sea levels 
eroding and “swallow[ing]” the Massachusetts coast.79  Since 
Massachusetts “owns a substantial portion of coastal property,” it had a 
particularized and personal injury in its “capacity as a landowner.”80  
Specifically, Massachusetts stood to lose an asset (its lands) and incur costs 
if climate change erosion continued unmitigated by EPA regulations.  As 
evidence, a Massachusetts official reasoned that “[i]f sea levels continue to 
rise as predicted . . . a significant fraction of coastal property will be ‘either 
permanently lost through inundation or temporarily lost through periodic 
storm surge and flooding events.’”81  The petitioners also alleged that 
remediation costs “could run well into the hundreds of millions of 
dollars.”82  Given that erosion and rising sea levels would undisputedly lead 
to the loss of Massachusetts’s sovereign territory, the State successfully 
proved concrete, particularized, imminent injury.83  Yet, the subsequent 
components of the Court’s reasoning emphasized the sovereign nature of 
Massachusetts’s claim, suggesting mere landownership is not sufficient.84 
In comparison, in Australia, what constitutes an injury is significantly 
more expansive, especially under key pieces of environmental legislation.  
For example, the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act of 1999 (the EPBC Act) requires “Commonwealth involvement in 
assessment and approval of an activity” involving a matter of national 
environmental significance85 or of activities that will likely have a 
significant environmental impact “inside or outside Australian 
jurisdiction.”86  Given the broad standing provision for plaintiffs,87 the 
emphasis of the injury inquiry is on the environment.  Thus, when bringing 
a claim based on improper environmental assessment under the EPBC 
Act,88 plaintiffs must show that emissions from proposed activities would 
 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 523. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 521. 
 84.  See infra Part I.B.1.b for a further discussion on this point. 
 85.  Pearson, supra note 44, at 325. 
 86.  Id. at 326. 
 87. See Preston, supra note 58, at 48 (discussing how the open standing provisions in much of the 
environmental legislation of New South Wales allow any person to bring a claim to remedy a breach of 
statute). 
 88.  Such a failure may involve the decision-maker improperly conducting the assessment and 
thus allowing the defendant to perform an activity that threatens protected environmental matters. 
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directly or indirectly affect a protected area or matter or identify the extent 
to which emissions would aggravate the climate change problem.89  Despite 
the difference in focus, the EPBC Act evidentiary threshold functions 
similarly to the U.S. requirement of a concrete and particularized injury to 
a protected interest.  The EPBC Act is just one example of planning 
legislation that requires decision-makers to conduct an assessment of 
environmental impacts.90 
Both U.S. and Australian injury requirements seek to establish that 
some particular harm has occurred as a result of the defendant’s actions. 
The U.S. requirement places more emphasis on linking the plaintiff and the 
defendant to the injury, whereas the focus under the EPBC Act is on 
environmental injury.  Additionally, the Australian formulation under the 
EPBC Act is more accommodating because it allows for either (1) 
particularized injury to a specific locality or plaintiff through direct or 
indirect means or (2) proof of aggravation of a global problem.  The 
doctrinal focus on harmful impacts to protected areas or on the global 
problem shifts the inquiry away from the claimant and towards the 
environment.  Furthermore, allowing courts to rule on environmental 
impacts outside Australian boundaries drastically expands the scope of the 
legislation and the court’s jurisdiction.  As a result, Australian courts can 
use environmental legislation to become global actors, assuming 
jurisdiction over global injuries and global issues.  In contrast, in the 
United States, the problem may be global, but the injury still needs to be 
particularized to a suitable plaintiff.  Substantially freed from finding the 
appropriate plaintiff to bring the claim and able to consider direct and 
indirect impacts, EPBC doctrine potentially enables the Australian courts to 
recognize a greater array of injuries than can their American counterparts. 
Still, the application of Australian doctrine to climate change is not 
always successful.  In Wildlife Preservation Society of Queensland 
Proserpine/Whitsunday Branch Inc. v Minister for the Environment & 
Heritage (Wildlife Whitsunday), the plaintiffs91 sought review of decisions 
under the EPBC Act regarding development of a new coal mine known as 
 
 89.  Lesley K. McAllister, Litigating Climate Change at the Coal Mine, in ADJUDICATING 
CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 13, at 48, 58. 
 90.  Pearson, supra note 44, at 325.  For a list of planning legislation incorporating environmental 
impact assessments, see also id.,at 325 n.18. 
 91.  While the text of the case uses “applicant,” the terms “applicant” and “plaintiff” are 
interchangeable, so the term “plaintiff” will be used here for the sake of consistency with the U.S. cases.  
See Roles in Court, COURTS & TRIBUNALS VICTORIA, http://www.courts.vic.gov.au/courts-tribunals/ 
going-court/roles-court/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2014) (stating that the plaintiff, complainant, or applicant 
is “the person who initiates the case in a non-criminal (civil) matter”). 
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the Isaac Plains project.92  Since the key question under the EPBC Act is 
whether “an action has, will have or is likely to have a significant impact 
on a matter protected by the Act,”93 the decision-maker, and ultimately the 
court in its review of the decision-maker’s assessment, had to consider the 
potential environmental effects of the proposed coal mine.  In its opinion, 
the court took the potential direct and indirect impacts of the mine into 
account but ultimately held that the factual circumstances and a lack of 
concrete evidence required dismissal of the case.94 The court was simply 
not convinced that “indirect impact” envisioned the “burning of coal at 
some unidentified place in the world, the production of greenhouse gases 
from such combustion, its contribution toward global warming and the 
impact of global warming upon a protected matter.”95  As such, even 
though it is possible to measure the quantity of greenhouse gases a 
particular project would produce,96 the court did not accept that quantity of 
GHG emissions qualified as adverse environmental impact on a protected 
matter.  The cumulative nature of climate change did not fit traditional 
notions of impact, and the court refused to allow the doctrine to expand to 
accommodate climate change. 
Additionally, the court concluded that GHG emissions of a single 
project do not cause “any particular local environmental impact.”97  The 
plaintiff focused on how GHG emissions lead to climate change but “paid 
little or no attention to the actual effect on an identified protected matter.”98  
Since the standard under the EPBC Act is “significant impact on a 
protected matter,”99 failing to show such injury proved fatal to the 
plaintiffs’ case.100  This part of the court’s ruling is similar to the U.S. 
requirement of a particularized injury.  Yet, since many areas are protected, 
evidence focusing on harm to one of those areas might have helped the 
plaintiff’s case.  Moreover, the injury to that protected matter can be 
indirect rather than concrete and particularized. 
 
 92.  (2006) 232 ALR 510, ¶ 9. 
 93.  Chris McGrath, Federal Court Case Challenges Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Coal 
Mines, Wildlife Whitsunday Case, ENVTL. L. PUBLISHING 1, 1 (2006), available at http://www.envlaw. 
com.au/whitsunday19.pdf. 
 94.  See 232 ALR, ¶¶ 72–73 (discussing the direct and indirect impacts of the mine and 
summarizing the circumstances for dismissal). 
 95.  Id. ¶ 72. 
 96.  McAllister, supra note 89, at 66. 
 97.  Id. at 66–67. 
 98.  232 ALR, ¶ 40. 
 99.  Id. ¶ 51. 
 100.  See id. ¶ 44 (“There was no significant impact for the purposes of Part 3.  The applicant must 
fail on each of its first two grounds.”). 
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Thus, in Australian courts as well as in U.S. courts, the global nature 
of climate change can be a major hurdle to proving injury.  Australian 
direct and indirect impacts doctrine appears more accommodating than the 
U.S. particularized injury requirement, but Wildlife Whitsunday 
demonstrates the limits on the judiciary to apply law as enacted.101  Courts 
may interpret legislation, at times expanding or accommodating new, 
potentially global, problems, but ultimately courts are and ought to be 
confined by how the law is written and by established doctrines.  For 
example, the court in Wildlife Whitsunday did not think the indirect impact 
doctrine could correctly be applied to GHG emissions from coal mines.102 
But, from the cases cited above, it appears the existence of a viable injury 
depends on how the plaintiffs and judges characterize climate change and 
on the relationship of the particular plaintiffs or environmental impacts to 
this global problem.  These limitations suggest that courts may not be able 
to adjudicate certain cases. 
b. Injury Based on Statutory and Procedural Rights 
In Gray v Minister for Planning, the Land and Environment Court of 
New South Wales103 considered whether an assessment by the Director-
General of the Department of Planning regarding a proposal to build a large 
coal mine, known as the Anvil Hill project, was void under the EP&A 
Act.104  The plaintiff claimed the Director-General had to consider the 
impact that burning coal would have on GHG levels and to take the 
ecologically sustainable development principles (ESD principles)105 into 
account in his environmental impact assessment.106 
In that case, the purported injury was related to the Director-General’s 
failure to appropriately consider those environmental impacts.  Under the 
Act, an “affected person”107 can obtain judicial relief if “he can show that 
the authority has misdirected itself in law or that it has failed to consider 
 
 101.  THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN ENVIRONMENTAL GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 44, at 344. 
 102.  McGrath, supra note 93, at 2. 
 103.  The Land and Environment Court is a special environment court composed of judges with 
relevant qualifications and experiences.  Generally, the court engages in merits review and judicial 
review of decisions.  Pearson, supra note 44, at 332–33. 
 104.  [2006] NSWLEC 720 (Unreported, Pain J, Nov. 27, 2006), ¶ 1. 
 105.  The ESD principles are the precautionary principle; intergenerational equity; conservation of 
biological diversity and ecological integrity; and improved valuation, pricing, and incentive 
mechanisms.  Pearson, supra note 44, at 327. 
 106.  [2006] NSWLEC 720, ¶ 35–45. 
 107.  Since the court did not address this component of standing, this paper will not analyze the 
notion of an “affected person.” 
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matters that it was required to consider or has taken irrelevant matters into 
account.”108  This standard indicates that the court, in conducting judicial 
review of decision-making, is limited to issues of law.  It could conclude 
the Director-General failed to perform his assessment in a manner required 
by law.  Here, the court carefully examined the environmental assessment 
requirements and concluded the Director-General had failed to adequately 
consider direct and indirect impacts and had failed to take ESD principles 
into account.109  As a result, his assessment was void.110  Thus, injury under 
the EP&A Act is not literal; it is the violation of a legal requirement that 
will lead to environmental harms that the statute is supposed to prevent.  
Such statues are critical in standing analysis because they enable the 
plaintiffs to ask the court to engage in judicial review of an agency decision 
and its purported deficiencies. 
Similarly, in the United States, statutes can create a procedural right, 
and violations of a procedural right are accorded special treatment under 
standing doctrine.  If Congress grants a litigant “a procedural right to 
protect his concrete interests,”111 then the litigant can invoke that right and 
achieve standing “without meeting all the normal standards for 
redressability and immediacy.”112  Effectively, Congress has predetermined 
that certain individuals have the right to bring certain claims to courts and 
has also authorized courts to hear such claims. Thus, raising a procedural 
violation enables plaintiffs to more easily fulfill standing requirements, 
especially injury, because plaintiffs only have to show that (1) they have 
already been granted the procedural right to protect their interests and (2) 
there is some threat to a concrete interest.113  Moreover, only one of the 
litigants needs to have such standing to obtain review by the courts,114 
allowing litigants with a procedural right to unite with other concerned, 
affected, and interested parties. 
For example, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, the plaintiffs 
alleged that emissions from projects supported by the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC)115 and the Export-Import Bank of the 
 
 108.  [2006] NSWLEC 720, ¶ 77. 
 109.  Id. ¶¶ 96–100, 143. 
 110.  Id. ¶ 152. 
 111.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at *2 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (quoting Douglas Cnty. v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 114.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 517. 
 115.  OPIC is an independent government development finance institution.  It offers political risk 
insurance, loans, and loan guarantees for projects in developing countries.  Watson, 2005 WL 2035596, 
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United States (Ex-Im)116 contributed to climate change without complying 
with requirements set forth in the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969 (“NEPA”)117 and the Administrative Procedure Act.118  They claimed 
that emissions from these projects caused adverse environmental impacts 
that resulted in injury to members of the organization nationwide.119  Their 
evidence demonstrated that (1) the aforementioned projects were directly or 
indirectly responsible for eight percent of the world’s annual emissions; (2) 
continued increases in GHG emissions would increase global warming, 
causing widespread environmental impacts; and (3) these impacts “have 
and will effect [sic] areas used and owned by Plaintiffs.”120  In response, 
the court held that the plaintiffs had an injury based on a procedural right 
because their evidence was “sufficient to demonstrate it is reasonably 
probable that emissions from projects supported by OPIC and Ex-Im 
support projects [sic] will threaten Plaintiffs’ concrete interests.”121 
Similarly, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the plaintiffs brought a claim 
challenging the EPA’s denial of the plaintiff’s rulemaking petition, which 
urged the EPA to fulfill its mandate to set emission standards.122  The 
plaintiffs had submitted the rulemaking petition because Congress had 
ordered the EPA to prescribe applicable standards for emissions under 42 
U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).123  The plaintiffs then filed suit in court because 
Congress had also provided the states a procedural “right to challenge the 
rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious” under 42 
U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).124  After holding that Massachusetts had suffered an 
injury,125 the Court analyzed Massachusetts’s claim with regard to its 
procedural right to bring a claim as a state. 
While Congress had not provided a private right of action, it had 
granted states a procedural right.  Furthermore, “states are not normal 
 
at *1; Who We Are, OVERSEAS PRIVATE INV. CORP., http://www.opic.gov/who-we-are/overview (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2013). 
 116.  Ex-Im is the official export credit agency of the United States and provides financing support 
for U.S. exports into international markets.  About Us, EXP.-IMP. BANK OF THE U.S., http://www.exim. 
gov/about/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2013). 
 117.  42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4335 (2012). 
 118.  5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012); Watson, 2005 WL 2035596, at *1. 
 119.  2005 WL 2035596, at *1. 
 120.  Id. at *3. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  549 U.S. 497, 519–20 (2007). 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. at 520. 
 125.  See supra Part II.B.1.a. 
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litigants for the purpose of invoking federal jurisdiction.”126  Due to the 
quasi-sovereign status of states, a state has “an interest independent of and 
behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.”127  
This interest means a state has standing to sue parens patriae if “the injury 
is one that the state, if it could, would likely attempt to address through its 
sovereign lawmaking powers.”128  Since the EPA refusal to regulate GHG 
emissions had caused actual and imminent harm to Massachusetts and 
since Massachusetts naturally has a desire to preserve its territory for its 
citizens, the State had suffered an injury and had standing to sue parens 
patriae.129 
Moreover, the Court emphasized that Congress had “authorized this 
type of challenge to EPA action,”130 giving courts the legitimacy and 
capacity to become involved.  Thus, while the Court was a local actor 
because it was interpreting a federal mandate requiring the EPA to set 
emission standards, it was also a global actor because the mandate 
envisions a response to a global problem.  Theoretically, such emission 
standards can actually decrease net emissions, thereby mitigating the risk of 
harm to the atmosphere, the environment, and the human population. 
c. Conclusions on Injury 
These cases suggest that procedural rights expand the inherent ability 
of courts to adjudicate a dispute.  In the United States, procedural rights 
make it more likely that a plaintiff will have standing because once a 
plaintiff establishes injury based on a procedural violation, some 
uncertainty about causation and redressability is acceptable.131  If, however, 
there is no procedural right, then a plaintiff must show a particularized and 
personal injury and then proceed to prove causation and redressability 
under traditional standards.  Consequently, if the procedural right relates to 
climate change, then it is likely that the local court can function as a global 
actor addressing a global problem.  In some cases, the identity of the 
plaintiff makes a difference.  For example, the Court’s emphasis on 
Massachusetts’s ability to sue parens patriae based on quasi-sovereign 
status suggests that this was an essential component of Massachusetts’s 
 
 126.  549 U.S. at 518. 
 127.  Id. at 518–19. 
 128.  Id. at 519 (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Bares, 458 U.S. 592, 
607 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 129.  Id. at 521. 
 130.  Id. at 516 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2006)). 
 131.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at *2 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992)). 
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ability to prove standing. 
While the plaintiff’s identity may be critical in U.S. courts, Australian 
courts, for the most part, do not focus on the plaintiff.  Instead, they focus 
on the injury itself.  This difference is due in part to the standing 
requirements in Australian legislation.  For instance, the EPBC Act allows 
“an ‘interested person’ to initiate proceedings for an injunction to enforce 
the act.”132  Given the breadth of this standard, courts are prone to skip a 
discussion of the plaintiffs and go straight to the purported injury.133  From 
that point, the court’s inquiry is a function of the legislation.  Australian 
cases tend to focus on either (1) whether injury will occur to a specific area 
or (2) whether required assessments have been properly conducted. 
Litigation under the EPBC Act is more like a traditional claim in the 
United States because the Act requires consideration of injury to protected 
areas.  The focus is on a specific environmental injury caused by climate 
change, much like the way in which the traditional injury in the United 
States focuses on concrete and particularized injury to the plaintiff or the 
plaintiff’s interests, as in Massachusetts v. EPA.134  In contrast, litigation 
under the EP&A Act is more akin to procedural-right claims because the 
issue before the court is proper fulfillment of a statutory requirement, as 
was the case in Watson.  Additionally, under the EP&A Act, the injury is 
the violation of procedural requirements mandated by law.  This distinction 
makes a difference because in Wildlife Whitsunday, a case under the EPBC 
Act, the court could not link the Isaac Plains coal mine to environmental 
harm to a protected matter, but in Gray, the court could determine that 
there had been a procedural violation of the EP&A Act. 
Ultimately, though their focuses and lines of inquiry differ, both U.S. 
and Australian courts use existing legislation and doctrines to assess 
climate change injuries.  Legislation implementing a procedural 
requirement or a procedural right facilitates the court’s ability to adjudicate, 
as in Gray and Watson, respectively.  For claims based on tangible injury, 
however, satisfying the standing requirement is a complicated task.  For 
instance, the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s ability to prove injury was an 
essential component of litigation in Massachusetts v. EPA, especially since 
the judges from the circuit court opinion debated what constituted injury.  
The Australian courts engaged in a similar debate in Wildlife Whitsunday, 
where the court had to evaluate what qualified as indirect impact.  
 
 132.  Pearson, supra note 44, at 340–41. 
 133.  None of the cases referenced in this paper discuss the plaintiffs per se. 
 134.  Despite the other factors of Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court still analyzed injury in a more 
traditional sense rather than as a procedural right violation.  See supra Part II.B.1.a. 
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Unfortunately, the complications involved in assessing climate change in 
light of standing doctrine do not end with injury.  Once courts determine 
there is an injury, they face the potentially more daunting task of 
establishing a causal link between the defendant’s actions and that injury. 
2. Causation 
While some actions or some actors emit more GHGs than others, these 
emissions cumulatively cause climate change, which causes injuries.  But, 
given the existence of an indeterminate number of emitters, the 
accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere, and the lapse of time and 
distance between emissions and harmful effects, “linking specific climate 
injuries to specific causes” is difficult at best and sometimes impossible.135  
For instance, a potential chain of proximate cause for climate change might 
look like this: 
 
(1) companies produce fuel, power, vehicles, etc.; (2) consumer use of 
these items generates greenhouse gas emissions, which rise into the 
atmosphere; (3) the emissions combine with other greenhouse gas 
emissions to warm the Earth; (4) this warming causes sea levels to rise, 
snowpack to melt, etc.; and (5) these effects cause damage to plaintiff’s 
property.136 
 
As a result of these factors, two major issues arise in relation to causation: 
cumulative emissions and traceability. 
First, climate change functions cumulatively.  It only happens because 
total GHG emissions have surpassed a safe and sustainable level.  As such, 
the overall mitigation achieved by one emitter or one nation setting 
emission limits has an almost imperceptible effect.  For example, if 
Australia does not allow projects for coal mining to proceed and does not 
export coal to Japan, then Japan will just acquire and burn coal from 
another source and the climate change harms will still occur, regardless of 
Australia’s state action.137  Adding to this complication, past and present 
emissions not only have immediate impact but also have consequences that 
may go unrealized for decades as GHGs continue to accumulate or sea 
levels continue to rise and eliminate coastal lands.  Consequently, the 
cumulative nature of climate change tends to complicate and often derail 
 
 135.  See Marilyn Averill, Climate Litigation: Ethical Implications and Societal Impacts, 85 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 899, 910 (2008) (discussing some of the inherent challenges involved in adjudicating climate 
change). 
 136.  David A. Grossman, Tort-Based Climate Litigation, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: 
STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 13, at 193, 219. 
 137.  McAllister, supra note 89, at 69. 
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the plaintiffs’ claims. 
Second, once these GHG emissions go up into the atmosphere where 
they cumulatively cause climate change, the harmful effects are felt around 
the world.  But, since the atmosphere encompasses the globe, belonging to 
all and yet none, it is nearly impossible to trace harmful levels of GHG 
emissions to their sources or to determine which combinations of sources 
caused a particular injury.  It is also difficult to properly allocate liability 
because the damage occurs beyond the boundaries of any one court’s 
jurisdiction. 
In the face of these considerations, the ability of local courts to 
incorporate a global problem like climate change into the traditional 
notions of causation is limited.  Nevertheless, U.S. law requires, and 
liability ultimately depends on, showing that the defendant or an 
instrumentality in the defendant’s control caused the plaintiff’s injury.138  In 
general, a plaintiff must show a “fairly traceable” causal connection.139  But 
that does not mean the “traceability” must “rise to the level of proximate 
causation.”140  Moreover, the United States is not unique in prescribing 
certain standards for and theories of causation.  As such, local courts have 
to decide exactly how much of a causal link is required in climate change 
claims. 
a. Causation under Common Law Claims 
In Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corporation, the Alaskan 
Inupiat Eskimo village Kivalina claimed that global warming was causing 
the sea ice protecting the Kivalina coast to thin, resulting in erosion and 
destruction that ultimately rendered Kivalina uninhabitable.141  The village 
brought a federal common law public nuisance claim against twenty-four 
oil, energy, and utility companies, seeking damages for the cost of 
relocation of the village.142  They sought to link the vast volume of GHGs 
that these companies had emitted to Kivalina’s climate change injury.143  
Establishing causation under standing doctrine, however, proved to be a 
major point of contention. 
For approaches to causation, the plaintiffs in Kivalina turned to prior 
 
 138.  Averill, supra note 135, at 911. 
 139.  Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(quoting Salmon Spawning & Recovery Alliance v. Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 140.  Id. at 878 (quoting Habecker v. Town of Estes Park, Colo., 518 F.3d 1217, 1225 (10th Cir. 
2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 141.  Id. at 868. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
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environmental and pollution cases, looking particularly at water pollution 
cases.  First, they argued that the “contribution approach” indicated the 
proper degree of causation required.144  Under this causation theory, which 
has been employed in water pollution cases, courts look at whether the 
plaintiff can prove that (1) the defendant’s polluting source is the “seed of 
[the plaintiff’s] injury” and (2) the defendant has not indemnified or 
proposed an alternative offender.145  The court, however, disagreed with the 
Kivalina plaintiffs.  First, it pointed out that, while there are similarities 
between water pollution and climate change, “[t]here is a critical distinction 
between a statutory water pollution claim versus a common law nuisance 
claim.”146  The statutory water pollution cases referenced by the plaintiffs 
relied on the Clean Water Act.147  The Clean Water Act establishes the 
presumption that discharge exceeding congressionally mandated limits 
gives rise to a substantial likelihood that the defendant caused the 
plaintiff’s harm, regardless of whether other parties made similar 
discharges.148  There is no comparable federal standard limiting GHG 
emissions, however, and no statutory presumption declaring that there is a 
substantial likelihood that the defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff’s 
injury.149  Thus, without statutory limits and statutory presumptions, the 
court could not apply the contribution approach, and it held that whether 
the defendant contributed to the injury was irrelevant.150  Given the nature 
of climate change, it makes sense that discharge alone or mere contribution 
is insufficient to create a causal link.  Otherwise, every emitter of GHGs 
would be potentially liable. 
Sua sponte, the court also briefly considered applying a “seed of 
injury” analysis, under which the plaintiffs would have needed to prove the 
emissions of the oil, energy, and utility companies were the source of their 
climate change injury.151  Unfortunately, this method is also difficult to 
apply to a global phenomenon like climate change.  Given the plaintiffs’ 
concessions regarding “the undifferentiated nature of greenhouse gas 
emissions from all global sources and their worldwide accumulation over 
long periods of time,” the court acknowledged that “there [was] no realistic 
 
 144.  Id. at 878. 
 145.  Id. at 879 (quoting Tex. Indep. Producers and Royalty Owners Ass’n v. EPA, 410 F.3d 964, 
974 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. at 879–80. 
 150.  Id. at 880. 
 151.  See id. at 879 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 
149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000)) (describing the standard for a “seed of injury” claim). 
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possibility of tracing any particular alleged effect of global warming to any 
particular emissions by any specific person, entity, group at any particular 
point in time.”152  When characterized in this manner, no matter how 
egregious or substantial the defendant’s emissions, the plaintiffs simply 
could not prove that the defendant’s conduct was the seed of their injury.153 
Finally, the court considered whether the plaintiffs were within the 
“zone of discharge” of the defendant, a test that had been used in several 
pollution cases.  For this approach, plaintiffs that are sufficiently in the 
discharge zone of a polluter can argue that their injuries are fairly traceable 
to that polluter’s actions.154  This method, however, is inapplicable for the 
same reasons that the “seed of injury” analysis failed: the inherently global 
nature of climate change prevents the plaintiffs from tracing the path of 
particular GHG emissions.155  Acknowledging this complication, the 
plaintiffs tried to argue that the geographical area for the zone of discharge 
in global warming cases should be the entire world.156  The court dismissed 
the argument because it “suggests that every inhabitant on this Earth is 
within the zone of discharge, thereby effectively eliminating the issue of 
geographic proximity in any case involving harms caused by global 
warming.”157  While not necessarily relevant in the context of climate 
change, geographic proximity would have been necessary to successfully 
prove causation under the zone of discharge theory.  Thus, while the 
argument accurately characterizes climate change as a global problem, the 
court’s reasoning suggests that the zone of discharge theory cannot 
accommodate climate change. 
In conclusion, the plaintiffs failed to assert causation, and thus the 
plaintiffs’ claim for nuisance was ultimately barred for lack of standing.158  
Kivalina demonstrates how existing doctrine can limit the court’s ability to 
rule on the merits of climate change cases.  While there are many available 
theories of causation, not all of them can be adapted to accommodate 
climate change.  Many of the methods that the plaintiffs tried to use are not 
applicable to and should not be used for climate change cases.  For 
example, the zone of discharge theory is not suited to a global problem due 
 
 152.  Id. at 880. 
 153.  Id. at 881. 
 154.  See id. (quoting Tex. Indep. Producers and Royalty Owners Ass’n v. EPA, 410 F.3d 964, 973 
(7th Cir. 2005)) (describing the “zone of discharge” standard). 
 155.  Id. at 881. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. at 863, 868–83.  While the claim was also barred under the political question doctrine, that 
issue is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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to its emphasis on geographical proximity.  The contribution approach, 
however, is not useful because limits and statutory presumptions do not 
exist for climate change.  Rather than suggesting courts cannot or should 
not adjudicate climate change suits, Kivalina demonstrates the need for 
judicially manageable standards by which to assess the causal link between 
emissions and injuries.  If there are no such standards, then courts simply 
do not have the capacity or legitimacy to assess such claims. 
b. Causation under Statutory Claims and Procedural Rights 
Plaintiffs have had far more success proving causation under statutory 
claims than under common law claims.  This success is due in part to the 
fact that when a plaintiff is proceeding under a procedural challenge, as in 
Watson, and has already established injury, the “causation and 
redressability standards are relaxed.”159  Specifically, to demonstrate 
standing in a procedural rights case, the “plaintiff must show not only that 
the defendant’s acts omitted some procedural requirement, but also that it is 
substantially probable that the procedural breach will cause the essential 
injury to the plaintiff’s own interest.”160  In Watson, the federal law in 
question, NEPA, required that the defendants conduct environmental 
assessments before giving support to certain projects.161  The statute also 
granted local courts the ability to ensure that this requirement was 
fulfilled.162  Given the plaintiffs’ reasoning that (1) the OPIC and Ex-Im 
projects were directly or indirectly responsible for eight percent of the 
world’s annual emissions, (2) continued increases in GHG emissions cause 
global warming, resulting in widespread environmental impacts, and (3) 
these impacts “have and will effect [sic] areas used and owned by 
Plaintiffs,”163 the court concluded that the plaintiffs “sufficiently 
demonstrated causation.”164  The attenuated causal link between a 
significant percentage of world GHG emissions and the general impact on 
areas that the plaintiffs owned and used by evidences the relaxed standards 
 
 159.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992)). 
 160.  Fla. Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664–65 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 161.  Id. at *1. 
 162.  NEPA claims were also pursued in Center for Biological Diversity v. United States 
Department of the Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009), in which the petitioners argued that the 
Department of the Interior’s approval of projects to expand leasing areas in the Outer Continental Shelf 
for offshore oil and gas development violated the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 
U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356a (2006), and NEPA because the Department did not consider the effect on 
climate change.  Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 471.  The NEPA claims were ultimately held 
not ripe for adjudication.  Id. at 472. 
 163.  2005 WL 2035596, at *3. 
 164.  Id. at *4. 
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under statutory claims. 
Similarly, in Wildlife Whitsunday, the Australian court was concerned 
with the environmental impacts the Minister is required to consider under 
section 75 of the EPBC Act.165  The plaintiffs argued that “[c]onsideration 
of the impacts of the action under section 75 of the EPBC Act must 
consider the potential impacts of greenhouse gas emissions from the 
burning of the coal on global warming and the consequential impacts on 
matters of national environmental significance.”166  Declaring that an 
impact is “the difference between the position if the action occurs and the 
position if it does not,”167 the court concluded that the purpose of the EPBC 
Act was “to prevent or minimize such adverse impacts” via the required 
consideration under section 75.168  Here, the focus was on environmental 
impacts resulting from the creation of the Isaac Plains mine.169  But, 
beyond the vague (though accurate) notion that “greenhouse gas emission 
is bad, and that the Australian government should do whatever it can to 
stop it,” the plaintiffs could not establish a traceable causal link between 
the project under consideration and potential adverse impacts on the 
environment.170  Furthermore, the court found that the Minister had 
fulfilled his statutory requirement to consider both the direct and indirect 
impacts of the specific project: the Minister had analyzed the possible 
direct impact on the Isaac River “as the result of pollution” and the indirect 
impacts, “includ[ing] the issue of greenhouse gas emission and climate 
change.”171  In other words, the Minister accounted for “the possibility that 
greenhouse gas emission might cause climate change and consequential 
effects upon protected matters.”172 
Interestingly, the actual emissions from the Isaac Plains Coal Project 
and the Sonoma Coal Project would have been responsible for GHG 
emissions equivalent to 25% of Australia’s total GHG emissions in 2003.173  
Yet, the court did not draw a causal connection between these projects and 
adverse impacts.  The court was limited in part by skepticism about its 
ability to apply the indirect impact doctrine to GHG emissions.  This 
 
 165.  Wildlife Pres. Soc’y of Queensl. Proserpine/Whitsunday Branch Inc. v Minister for the En’t & 
Heritage (Wildlife Whitsunday), (2006) 232 ALR 510, ¶ 8. 
 166.  Id. ¶ 11. 
 167.  Id. ¶ 55. 
 168.  Id. ¶ 57. 
 169.  Id. ¶ 9. 
 170.  Id. ¶ 72. 
 171.  Id. ¶ 22. 
 172.  Id. ¶ 42. 
 173.  McGrath, supra note 93, at 4. 
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limitation suggests a deficiency in the EPBC Act, the indirect impacts 
language of which does not accommodate climate change injuries.174  The 
global nature of climate change and the injuries it causes also limited the 
court.  The global problem simply did not fit within the causation doctrine 
the court had at its disposal. 
The chain of causation was also a major point of contention in Gray.  
In this case, the plaintiffs proceeded under the EP&A Act and claimed 
noncompliance with the environmental assessment requirements therein, as 
described in section 75.175  The plaintiffs argued that “it was common sense 
to determine that there would be greenhouse impacts resulting from the 
burning of the coal from the Anvil Hill Project which would contribute to 
global warming/climate change and that therefore this impact should be 
considered in the environmental assessment for the project.”176  But the 
court found it “problematic” to apply a common sense approach, created 
for establishing liability in private law matters, where the plaintiff’s injury 
is in connection with the breach of a duty of care, to an appellate case on 
environmental assessments under the EP&A Act.177  Since there were no 
climate change cases in which such reasoning had been “applied in a 
judicial review context” and since other cases had established “limitations 
in relation to the application” of a common sense approach where it had 
been applied, the court was simply not going to allow the doctrine to be 
expanded and applied to climate change cases.178 
In contrast to the method suggested by the plaintiffs, many prior 
climate change cases had required Australian courts to analyze “what 
impacts are sufficiently related to the proposed activity and therefore 
necessary to be considered in environmental assessments.”179  These cases 
had established the principle that impacts sufficiently connected to a 
project, including off-site impacts resulting from third parties, ought to be 
considered.180  Additionally, courts in these cases had held that where a 
“‘real and sufficient link’ is demonstrated,” external environmental impacts 
are relevant to the assessment of total environmental impact.181  
 
 174.  See id. at 4–5 (proposing that the EPBC Act does not effectively regulate coal mine emissions 
and that there is a need for a greenhouse gas trigger under the EPBC Act). 
 175.  Gray v Minister for Planning [2006] NSWLEC 720 (Unreported, Pain J, Nov. 27, 2006), ¶ 
15. 
 176.  Id. ¶ 83. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. ¶ 84. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Id. 
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Furthermore, a wider inquiry into impacts could be required to the extent 
that significant effects are likely.182 Referring to this case law under the 
EP&A Act, the court reiterated the duty to consider direct and indirect 
effects,183 finding a sufficient link existed between the Anvil Hill Project, 
climate change, and impacts on the environment.  The court stated: 
 
  Given the quite appropriate recognition by the Director-General that 
burning the thermal coal from the Anvil Hill Project will cause the 
release of substantial GHG in the environment which will contribute to 
climate change/global warming which, I surmise, is having and/or will 
have impacts on the Australian and consequently NSW environment it 
would appear that Bignold J’s test of causation based on a real and 
sufficient link is met.184 
 
Importantly, the court also discussed climate change and how it should 
fit into existing doctrine: 
 
Climate change/global warming is widely recognised as a significant 
environmental impact to which there are many contributors worldwide 
but the extent of the change is not yet certain and is a matter of dispute.  
The fact there are many contributors globally does not mean the 
contribution from a single large source such as the Anvil Hill Project in 
the context of NSW should be ignored in the environmental assessment 
process.  The coal intended to be mined is clearly a potential major 
single contributor to GHG emissions deriving from NSW given the large 
size of the proposed mine.  That the impact from burning the coal will be 
experienced globally as well as in NSW, but in a way that is currently 
not able to be accurately measured, does not suggest that the link to 
causation of an environmental impact is insufficient.185 
 
The court impeccably articulated the challenges of a global problem.  
It addressed how cumulative emissions cause climate change and, much 
like the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, disaggregated the global 
and cumulative nature of the problem from the ability to find causation 
from a certain project or a certain injury.  Ultimately holding the 
assessment void,186 the local court, by following this line of reasoning and 
by applying statutory and case law, was able to find causation, address a 
global problem, and become a global actor. 
 
 182.  Id. ¶ 88. 
 183.  Id. ¶ 91. 
 184.  Id. ¶ 97. 
 185.  Id. ¶ 98. 
 186.  Id. ¶ 152. 
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c. Conclusions on Causation 
As in the injury analysis, the cumulative nature of climate change and 
the difficulty of tracing emissions to injuries frequently prevent courts from 
finding causation under traditional standards.  Under certain circumstances, 
courts find a causal link, as in Massachusetts v. EPA.  More often, plaintiffs 
have success establishing causation under a statutory, as opposed to a 
common law, claim.  In the United States, traditional causation doctrine for 
plaintiffs pursuing a common law claim is unfavorable for global problems 
like climate change because it requires an impossibly close link between 
emission sources and injuries.  Even other environmental causation theories 
are not applicable because other forms of pollution do not operate in the 
same way that climate change does.  As a result, courts simply cannot use 
those doctrines.  For instance, in Kivalina, the court could not consider the 
merits of the case because the plaintiffs did not (or could not) adequately 
trace the defendants’ GHG emissions to global warming and then to their 
injury. Since they failed to demonstrate causation, they did not have 
standing.  If, however, there is a statute in place providing a procedural 
right, then it is significantly easier to prove causation because the standards 
are relaxed.  This circumstance occurred in Watson, where the plaintiff’s 
evidence on causation was sufficient, though not significantly more precise 
than the seed of injury evidence considered sua sponte by the court in 
Kivalina.  These cases exemplify the essentialness of the relaxation of the 
causation requirement because establishing a causal link between a 
particular activity and a particular injury is inherently problematic in a suit 
based on the global accumulation of GHGs. 
Meanwhile, the Australian causation standard is significantly more 
expansive than the U.S. standard because the impacts considered in 
environmental assessments in Australia can be direct or indirect.  This 
direct or indirect impacts test is better suited to climate change because 
GHG emissions, which cause environmental injuries only through the 
global warming caused by their accumulation, inherently have an indirect 
effect on protected matters.  Nevertheless, Australian courts still face 
challenges under the causation prong.  The court in Wildlife Whitsunday 
was unable to find causation under the EPBC Act due to its inability to fit 
the nature of climate change into the existing indirect impact doctrine.  The 
court in Gray, however, not only established a causal link but also 
explained how the EP&A Act assessment standards adequately 
accommodated the unique problem of climate change.  The court 
demonstrated an acute understanding of the issue by acknowledging and 
accepting uncertainties to a certain degree and then fitting climate change 
into doctrine available under case law.  This case also suggests that 
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Australian legislation and, in turn, local environmental courts are 
significantly more prepared to handle global problems like climate change. 
Still, these successes and failures demonstrate that much will depend 
on the circumstances of the case, the degree of causation required under 
either common or statutory law, and how plaintiffs phrase their arguments.  
Plaintiffs will be most successful at establishing causation when they 
present evidence showing a more particular causal link than the general and 
vague argument that emissions cause climate change and climate change 
causes adverse effects.  While this statement may be true, it does not help 
courts trace the defendants’ actions to the injuries at issue.  As seen in 
Wildlife Whitsunday and Kivalina, however, it is not always possible to 
provide such a precise link, and where such uncertainty is unacceptable, 
courts will simply not have the capacity to address a global problem like 
climate change. 
3. Redressability 
Once, and if, plaintiffs satisfy injury and causation standards, they 
face another task: proving redress.  They must show that the court is 
functionally able to provide a remedy by requiring agency action, holding 
agency action invalid,187 or, in the case of private defendants, awarding 
damages.188  Essentially, the redressability prong concerns the court’s 
ability to effect change.  A single court judgment against a single defendant 
will not solve climate change because other parties will continue to emit 
GHGs.  If this interpretation were the only one, then redressability would 
be a permanent hurdle to adjudicating climate change.  Therefore, courts 
often consider redressability in light of administrative decisions under 
statutes or mandates related to climate change.  Shifting away from literal 
redress, such as completely alleviating the plaintiff’s injury, towards 
symbolic redress, such as requiring an agency to act in an appropriate way 
or follow its mandate, enables courts to address climate change within the 
bounds of their judicial and doctrinal capacity. 
a. Redress against Administrative Agencies 
In response to the redressability requirement for standing, in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA contended that even if there were a 
 
 187.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992) (“[S]tanding depends 
considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue.  If 
he is, there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a 
judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.”). 
 188. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 127 (1998) (“When one private party is 
injured by another, the injury can be redressed . . . by awarding compensatory damages . . . .”). 
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traceable injury, it did not “believe that any realistic possibility exists that 
the relief petitioners seek would mitigate global climate change and remedy 
their injuries.”189  It argued that a local court decision requiring a national 
administrative agency to set emission standards cannot solve climate 
change because foreign countries may continue to emit at will, GHGs will 
still accumulate in destructive amounts, and climate change will still result 
in injuries.190  Therefore, the EPA concluded that the court is not a proper 
forum for global problems like climate change because its actions cannot 
significantly affect the global problem.191  The Court rejected the EPA’s 
contention.192  In doing so, it shifted away from literal redress towards a 
more nuanced form that is more appropriate for the judiciary and for a 
global problem.  It acknowledged legislative action does not “resolve 
massive problems in one fell regulatory swoop.”193  It declared that the 
EPA incorrectly relied on the assumption that “a small incremental step, 
because it is incremental, can never be attacked in a federal judicial 
forum.”194 This assumption is erroneous because federal courts still have 
jurisdiction to “determine whether that step conforms to law”195 and can 
provide redress by making such a determination.  The Court set a standard: 
if the “risk of catastrophic harm, though remote, is nevertheless real” and 
“[t]hat risk would be reduced to some extent if petitioners received the 
relief they seek,” then there is standing.196  The importance of this 
determination in the context of climate change litigation cannot be 
overstated.  Essentially, the Court accepted the global nature of the issue 
but declared that it can still adjudicate climate change and play a role in 
solving the problem. 
This conclusion means that given a combination of facts and 
circumstances that satisfy standing requirements, local courts are viable 
forums to address climate change.  They can become global forums by 
ruling on the actions that fall within their jurisdictional and judicial 
capacity.  For example, U.S. courts can address EPA actions and interpret 
Congressional mandates197 whereas Australian courts can ensure 
 
 189.  549 U.S. 497, 523 (2007). 
 190.  Id. at 523–24. 
 191.  Id. at 525. 
 192.  Id. at 524–25. 
 193.  Id. at 524. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. at 526. 
 197.  Id. at 516. 
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compliance with statutes such as the EPBC Act198 and the EP&A Act.199  
So, while holding the EPA responsible for regulating motor-vehicle 
emissions “will not by itself reverse global warming, it by no means 
follows that [the Court] lack[s] jurisdiction to decide whether the EPA has 
a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it.”200 
Similarly, in Watson, since the plaintiffs sued under a procedural right 
and successfully proved injury and causation, they only had to show that 
the agency’s “decision could be influenced by the environmental 
considerations that [the relevant public statute] requires an agency to 
study” to satisfy the redressability prong.201  There, the court determined 
that the OPIC and Ex-Im decisions could have been influenced by further 
environmental studies required under NEPA.  Since the plaintiffs were able 
to prove injury, causation, and redressability and were challenging final 
agency actions under a statute that did not specifically preclude judicial 
review, they were able to bring their case before the courts.202  Thus, local 
courts were a viable forum to rule on the merits of the claim and potentially 
hold OPIC and Ex-Im liable for the global effects of their choices and 
actions,203 even if that included projects condoned far from the local court’s 
geographic jurisdiction.204  This case exemplifies the ways in which local 
courts can ensure that agencies take climate change into account when 
taking action under relevant legislation.  It is also one indication that local 
courts can compel action to address a global problem. 
b. Redress in Response to Administrative Decisions 
Some courts also possess the power to conduct judicial review in order 
to provide redress for incorrectly performed environmental assessments.  
As an example, in Gray, the plaintiffs claimed the Director-General did not 
take the ESD principles—in particular, the precautionary principle and the 
principle of intergenerational equity—into account when assessing the 
 
 198.  Wildlife Pres. Soc’y of Queensl. Proserpine/Whitsunday Branch Inc. v Minister for the En’t & 
Heritage (Wildlife Whitsunday), (2006) 232 ALR 510, ¶ 8. 
 199.  Gray v Minister for Planning [2006] NSWLEC 720 (Unreported, Pain J, Nov. 27, 2006), ¶ 1. 
 200.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 525. 
 201.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (quoting Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 975 
(9th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 202.  Watson, 2005 WL 2035596, at *8. 
 203.  See id. at *6 (discussing the plaintiff’s challenge of the actions of Ex-Im and OPIC). 
 204.  Ex-Im and OPIC facilitate projects around the world.  Who We Are, OVERSEAS PRIVATE INV. 
CORP., http://www.opic.gov/who-we-are/overview (last visited Jan. 2, 2013); About Us, EXP.-IMP. 
BANK OF THE U.S., http://www.exim.gov/about/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2013). 
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environmental impact of the Anvil Hill Project.205  They argued that it was 
therefore the court’s responsibility to determine whether the Director-
General had complied with the legal requirements embodied in the EP&A 
Act.206 
First, the court had to assess what was required under the ESD 
principles. The precautionary principle stands for the notion that “if there 
are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures 
to prevent environmental degradation.”207  The intergenerational equity 
principle provides that “the present generation should ensure that the 
health, diversity, and productivity of the environment are maintained or 
enhanced for the benefit of future generations.”208  When the 
intergenerational equity principle is applied to an environmental 
assessment, it is particularly important to analyze the “cumulative impacts 
of proposed activities on the environment.”209  Since cumulative emissions 
cause climate change, this principle is particularly applicable to climate 
change cases.  More importantly, it allows courts to apply a broad principle 
that already exists in their doctrinal arsenal to reach a global problem. 
In Gray, the court articulated that the existence of cumulative effects 
does not preclude consideration of an environmental impact.  Bearing the 
precautionary principle in mind, the court reasoned that “failure to consider 
cumulative impact will not adequately address the environmental impact of 
a particular development where often no single event can be said to have 
such a significant impact that it will irretrievably harm a particular 
environment but cumulatively activities will harm the environment.”210  
The court readily applied these principles to climate change and required 
the Director-General to do so as well, holding that the difficulty of 
“quantify[ing] an impact with precision” did not excuse the Director-
General from assessing such impacts and taking into account the principles 
he is legally required to consider.211 
While acutely aware of its limited role and the need to avoid intruding 
on an administrative decision, the court also knew it had the power and the 
duty to hold administrative agencies accountable for failure to fulfill a legal 
 
 205.  Gray v Minister for Planning [2006] NSWLEC 720 (Unreported, Pain J, Nov. 27, 2006), ¶ 
101. 
 206.  Id. ¶ 1. 
 207.  Id. ¶ 101. 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  Id. ¶ 122. 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id. ¶ 138. 
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requirement.212  Accordingly, the court exercised its discretion to grant 
relief213 by holding the environmental assessment void.214 In doing so, the 
court not only considered the detrimental impacts of climate change but 
also ensured that those impacts would be considered in determining 
whether a GHG-emitting mine can be operated.  It provided redress to a 
global problem. 
c. Redress against Private Defendants 
In contrast to decisions involving administrative agencies, redress for 
private defendants has been largely unsuccessful.  For example, when the 
Alaskan Inupiat Eskimo village Kivalina filed a complaint against several 
oil companies, power companies, and utility providers, alleging federal 
common law public nuisance, state law private and public nuisance, civil 
conspiracy, and concert of action,215 the court did not even address the 
redressability prong of standing because the plaintiffs could not establish 
causation.216  The problem was not only that the defendants were private 
companies rather than agencies with congressional mandates or statutes to 
enact, but also that the plaintiff was a private party with no special status. 
 As seen in the above-mentioned cases, without special status or a 
procedural right, standing is more difficult to achieve.  So, seeking to 
replicate Massachusetts’ success in Massachusetts v. EPA, Kivalina sought 
the special solicitude “generally afforded to sovereigns,”217 which would 
have entitled them to special standing requirements.218  Unlike 
Massachusetts, however, Kivalina was “not seeking to enforce any 
procedural rights concerning an agency’s rulemaking authority.”219  
Instead, Kivalina made a claim for damages against private entities.220  But 
states only retain a procedural right to challenge federal agency actions 
because they have surrendered certain sovereign prerogatives to the federal 
government, which exercises those prerogatives through agency action 
(here, by issuing a federal mandate to the EPA to set emission 
 
 212.  Id. ¶ 126. 
 213.  Id. ¶ 145. 
 214.  Id. ¶ 152. 
 215.  Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 869 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 216.  Id. at 877–82 (illustrating that the court’s discussion of Article III standing includes an 
analysis of contribution to injury and various theories of causation but does not include redressability). 
 217.  Id. at 882. 
 218.  See id. (discussing the special situation of states and their entitlement to special solicitude in 
the standing analysis). 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id. 
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standards).221  Thus, while Massachusetts could bring a claim against a 
federal administrative agency, Kivalina could not bring a claim against 
private oil, power, and utility companies.  Moreover, Kivalina could not 
even invoke quasi-sovereign status to sue parens patriae because that 
status is “predicated on the rights a State relinquishes to the federal 
government when it ‘enters the Union’”222 and Kivalina is a village, not a 
state.  Consequently, this case also demonstrates that success in climate 
change cases in the United States is predominantly limited to cases against 
administrative agencies rather than private defendants. 
In contrast, in the Nigerian case Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum 
Development Co. Nigeria, private plaintiffs successfully brought a claim 
against private defendants.223  Much as the people of Kivalina joined 
together as a village to sue private oil, power, and utility companies, 
members of a local community in the Niger Delta joined together as a class 
and sued oil companies engaged in gas flaring in their community.  Since 
the plaintiffs were Nigerian citizens in a Nigerian forum, the court readily 
concluded that the plaintiffs had standing224 and proceeded to address the 
merits of their claims. 
The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ gas flaring activities 
seriously polluted the air,225 adversely affected climate change,226 and 
caused injury to the health of the community.227  Since natural gas drilling 
and gas flaring by foreign companies in Nigeria contribute more GHGs 
than the rest of sub-Saharan Africa combined,228 the plaintiffs were not 
exaggerating.  They argued that this activity was a 
 
violation of their fundamental rights to life (including healthy 
environment) and dignity of human person guaranteed by sections 33(1) 
and 34(1) of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and 
reinforced by articles 4, 16 and 24 of the African Charter on Human and 
 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  Id. at 882 (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007)). 
 223.  (2005) AHRLR 151, ¶ [2](2), available at http://www1.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/ 
publications/ahrlr/ahrlr_2005.pdf. 
 224.  Id. ¶ [5](1) (“[T]he applicants were properly granted leave to institute these proceedings in a 
representative capacity for himself and for each and every member of the Iweherekan Community in 
Delta State of Nigeria.”). 
 225.  Id. ¶ [4](4). 
 226.  Id. ¶ [4](7)(c). 
 227.  Id. ¶ [4](4). 
 228.  Amy Sinden, An Emerging Human Right to Security from Climate Change: The Case against 
Gas Flaring in Nigeria, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL 
APPROACHES, supra note 13, at 173, 177.  While the climate change effects are far-reaching and global 
in nature, the harms are also acutely felt within Nigeria.  Id. 
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Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap A9, vol1, Laws 
of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.229 
 
The rights constitutionally guaranteed by these documents include the 
right to clean, poison- and pollution-free healthy environments.230  The 
plaintiffs further claimed that the defendants’ failure “to carry out 
environmental impact assessment[s] in the applicant’s community 
concerning the effects of their gas flaring activities is a violation of section 
2(2) of the Environmental Impact Assessment Act, Cap E12 vol. 6 Laws of 
the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.”231  By using the climate change harms 
resulting from the defendants’ gas flaring activities as the basis to invoke 
their constitutional and human rights,232 the plaintiffs forced the court to 
interpret the right to life to include protection from the harmful effects of 
climate change. 
Technically, the plaintiffs won their case.  The court held that the 
aforementioned constitutionally guaranteed rights “inevitably include[] the 
rights to clean, poison-free, pollution-free healthy environment[s]”233 and 
that the oil exploration and production activities of the defendants are a 
“gross violation of [the] fundamental right to life . . . and dignity of human 
person as enshrined in the Constitution.”234  The decision, however, 
contains major deficiencies in its treatment of climate change.  While the 
court read the right to life to include environmental rights,235 it did not 
determine the circumstances in which climate change harms constitute a 
violation of that fundamental right.236  Based on the enormous 
contributions that gas flaring makes to climate change and on climate 
change’s harmful effects on populations, it is possible that “where plaintiffs 
 
 229.  (2005) AHRLR, ¶ [2](2). 
 230.  Id. ¶ [2](1). 
 231.  Id. ¶ [2](3). 
 232.  Sinden, supra note 228, at 179 (citing Motion Ex Parte under Section 46(1) of the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Statement Pursuant to Order 1, Rule 2(3) of the 
Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, and Verifying Affidavit Pursuant to Order 1 Rule 
2(3) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum 
Development Co., (2005) AHRLR 151 (Suit No. FHC/CS/B/153/2005), available at http://www. 
climatelaw.org/cases/country/nigeria/gasflares/ (“Read the Plaintiff’s Pleadings”); see also Gbemre, 
(2005) AHRLR, ¶ [4](7)(c) (“That burning of gas by flaring same in their community gives rise to the 
following: . . . Contributes to adverse climate change as it emits carbon dioxide and methane which 
causes warming of the environment, pollutes their food and water.”). 
 233.  Id. ¶ [5](3). 
 234.  Id. ¶ [5](4). 
 235.  See id. (holding that continuing to flare gas, which causes adverse environmental effects and 
contributes to global climate change, is a violation of the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to life). 
 236.  Sinden, supra note 228, at 181. 
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can show they will suffer some risk of death or personal injury from the 
impacts of climate change, they may be able to claim a violation of the core 
civil and political rights to life, dignity, and personal security.”237  This 
formulation empowers local courts to use their doctrines on fundamental 
rights to address a global issue when the local population suffers the 
devastating effects of climate change.  Theoretically, local courts could 
force private defendants, one by one, in incremental steps, to stop or correct 
a destructive behavior with global as well as local effects.  Since not much 
has happened in the wake of the Gbemre decision,238 it has yet to be seen if 
other local courts will use this theory. 
d. Conclusions on Redressability 
The discussion of redressability reveals that local courts are well 
aware that agency actions are not expected to cure problems in one fell 
swoop.  Actions required under statutes or mandates, such as setting 
emission standards to slow or reduce global warming or considering certain 
aspects of climate change in environmental assessments, are intended to 
“whittle away at [problems] over time.”239  When plaintiffs bring claims 
related to these statutes or mandates, local courts can redress agency 
actions rather than climate change per se.  These courts, particularly in 
Australia and the United States, provide redress by holding agencies 
accountable and ensuring that the agencies consider and react to climate 
change as mandated by the executive or legislature.240  This makes local 
courts indirect global actors because they use their judicial role to reach a 
global problem. 
Still, in the United States, it has yet to be seen how narrowly or 
broadly courts will construe the seminal case Massachusetts v. EPA and 
whether future plaintiffs will be able to present claims with sufficient 
particularity to achieve standing.  With its holding, the Court opened the 
door for a specific set of cases, but since (1) the harms of climate change 
affect the global population, not just individual plaintiffs; (2) not all 
plaintiffs are states; and (3) not all injured parties can invoke a federal 
statute or agency inaction, many climate change cases may remain 
nonjusticiable.  And, as a result, courts will not be able to provide redress. 
Without the appropriate doctrinal tools to actually provide redress, 
courts are functionally not the appropriate venue for climate change.  
 
 237.  Id. at 186. 
 238.  See id. at 181 (noting that the defendants still have not stopped flaring). 
 239.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007). 
 240.  The discussions of Massachusetts v. EPA and Gray v Minister of Planning attest to this 
statement. 
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Performing judicial review and holding that an agency did not fulfill legal 
requirements is a normal role.  Courts can interpret the law and then require 
agencies to correct their conduct, as in Gray or Massachusetts v. EPA.  
Courts, however, are neither equipped nor entitled to set standards 
themselves or to determine that parties are liable without using judicially 
manageable standards, which would be found in legislation and existing 
doctrine.  So while the inability to offer redress in cases like Kivalina is 
unfortunate, courts are also not the appropriate forums for such cases.  Still, 
where courts retain the functionality, legitimacy, and capacity to provide 
redress, they are particularly well suited to address a global problem like 
climate change. 
III. BECOMING PART OF THE SOLUTION 
A. How Courts Address Global Problems 
The above cases demonstrate that the global nature of the problem 
does not seem to be changing the way courts tackle climate change.  Local 
courts use local legislation and local doctrines to address this global 
problem.  Plaintiffs still have to meet traditional standing requirements, and 
courts must follow existing statutes, case law, principles, and doctrines.  
Because these doctrines were developed for localized problems, localized 
parties, and discrete jurisdictions, they do not always adapt easily to 
accommodate a global problem like climate change.  Standing, for 
example, is intended to weed out issues that are not appropriate or not ripe 
for adjudication.  As a result, some climate change claims will not have 
standing and courts will simply not be able to adjudicate. 
This result, however, is neither a problem nor necessarily a “flaw in 
the system” because “an inescapable result of any standing doctrine 
application is that at least some disputes will not receive judicial 
review.”241  Climate change, with its latent effects caused by cumulative 
emissions, often does not fit nicely into the existing standing criteria.  As a 
result, many plaintiffs’ claims will fail before courts can even rule on the 
merits.  This was the case in Kivalina, where the plaintiffs could not prove 
causation, and in Wildlife Whitsunday, where the court could not establish 
injury despite the expansive direct and indirect effects test.  In this way, 
doctrine can impede climate change litigation by limiting courts to the rules 
and standards available and applicable.  Conversely, if the problem is 
characterized in a way that fits into existing doctrine, then courts can 
adjudicate.  In Gray, the EP&A standards and ESD principles readily 
 
 241.  Fla. Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
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accommodated climate change.  In other circumstances, the existence of a 
procedural right or special standing modifies the doctrine applied by the 
courts into one that more easily accommodates global problems.  This was 
the case in Watson and Massachusetts v. EPA respectively.  In sum, where 
doctrine empowers courts, courts can address global problems like climate 
change. 
B. The Institutional Role of Courts 
1. Jurisdictional Authority 
Even when local courts do possess the jurisdictional authority and 
willingness to address climate change, it is debatable whether a global 
problem like climate change ought to be subject to judicial review.  Courts 
have a limited institutional capacity, but in many cases they are well suited 
to address global problems.  First, courts place checks on the legislative 
and executive branches and can serve as a means of accountability for 
administrative agencies.242  Therefore, if legislation requires an agency to 
take action on climate change, such as the federal mandate to the EPA to 
set emission standards or the EP&A Act requirement that Director-
Generals consider climate change in environmental assessments, then 
courts can apply judicial reasoning to assess the situation.  After evaluating 
the legal requirements, courts can hold agencies accountable.  They can 
oblige the EPA to create emission standards or require environmental 
assessments to include climate change. 
While they are responding to local plaintiffs and national actors, at the 
core, local courts are addressing a global problem.  The courts are not 
setting emission standards or coordinating efforts across national 
boundaries, but they are requiring action to be taken in solving a global 
problem.  Like agencies that are required to “whittle away at [massive 
problems] over time, refining their preferred approach as circumstances 
change and as they develop a more-nuanced understanding of how best to 
proceed,”243 courts can address climate change little by little, according to 
the scope provided by existing doctrines, particularly standing doctrine. 
2. Courts as an Appropriate Forum for Climate Change 
As local courts confront climate change, the question remains how, 
 
 242.  See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009) (“The Administrative 
Procedure Act . . . sets forth the full extent of judicial authority to review executive agency action for 
procedural correctness.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 
644 (1950) (“The Administrative Procedure Act was framed against a background of rapid expansion of 
the administrative process as a check upon administrators.”). 
 243.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 524. 
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can, and should they be making decisions, taking action, and delegating 
responsibility and liability.  In this era of globalization, courts are 
responding to international, cross-border, and global problems, and they are 
not allowing the transnational nature of these problems to frustrate their 
ability to act.244  This willingness and ability to address global concerns 
indicates the increasingly global role of local courts.  Yet even if courts are 
willing and able, three main issues arise: functionality, legitimacy, and 
capacity. 
a. Functionality 
The first consideration is why local courts, rather than supranational 
institutions, political branches, and global markets, are suited to tackle 
global problems.245  In the case of climate change, no single institution 
possesses the authority to regulate the atmosphere, and there is no world 
court with superior jurisdiction.  Most importantly, climate change is a 
global phenomenon.  As GHGs are a substance “fairly consistent in 
concentration throughout the world’s atmosphere,”246 climate change 
cannot be localized.  Emissions may occur in a particular locale, but 
climate change does not have local origins.  Harm is only caused by 
accumulation of increasing levels of GHGs in the atmosphere.  Further, the 
impact of climate change may be felt locally, particularly in coastal 
areas,247 but simply addressing local components will not solve the 
problem.  For example, in the Gbemre case, emissions and injury occurred 
in the same locale as the one in which the court was located.  That court’s 
decision, however, has no effect on emissions from Australian coal mines, 
and those emissions also contribute to climate change and therefore to the 
harms felt in Nigeria.  Ultimately, the effects of climate change are felt in 
different ways and to differing degrees in different locales both near and 
far248 from major sources of emissions. 
Local courts have functional advantages in addressing such a global 
problem.249  First, local courts are established fora with existing laws and 
 
 244.  See generally WILLIAM J. ACEVES, THE ANATOMY OF TORTURE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF FILÁRTIGA V. PEÑA IRALA 168 (2007) (“‘[D]omestic courts are increasingly less content . . . to allow 
national boundaries to frustrate the efficacy of the civil justice process’ [in tort litigation].”). 
 245.  See Michaels, supra note 9, at 5 (discussing U.S. courts in the role of world courts). 
 246.  Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,927 
(Sept. 8, 2003) (emphasis added). 
 247.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, and Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 
663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 878 (N.D. Cal. 2009), are examples of cases based on injury to coastal areas. 
 248.  In Kivalina the village is in northern Alaska, whereas ExxonMobil and other oil, energy, and 
utility companies emit GHGs all over the world, not only in close proximity to Kivalina. 
 249.  See Michaels, supra note 9, at 19 (discussing the functional advantages of U.S. courts). 
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developed doctrine.  When those laws pertain to climate change, courts can 
use their doctrines to address and mitigate the problem.  For instance, the 
Australian Land and Environment Court possesses the expertise and 
jurisdiction to adjudicate matters under environmental laws, such as the 
EP&A Act, which address climate change.  In Gray, the court did just that 
and successfully addressed climate change by requiring the Director-
General to take into account environmental impacts and ESD principles in 
his assessment of the Anvil Hill Project.250  Second, local courts have the 
institutional ability to ensure compliance with their decisions in ways that 
international courts would not.  For instance, after Massachusetts v. EPA, 
the United States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia upheld 
emissions standards set by the EPA.251  Third, local courts are readily 
accessible to scores of plaintiffs, and the parties will often be familiar with 
their own legal system.252  As an example, Nigerian plaintiffs brought suit 
in Nigerian courts against multinational corporations in the Gbemre case. 
b. Legitimacy 
Despite these functional advantages, local courts apply local laws and 
doctrines within the local system to a problem that cannot be localized.  
Moreover, while these local courts are only locally accountable, their 
actions may have impacts beyond their jurisdictions.  Thus, courts also run 
the risk of interfering with foreign affairs.  This situation raises both 
internal and external concerns about legitimacy. 
Internally, states may frown upon local courts addressing non-local 
problems due to the dubious boundary between cases suited for 
adjudication and cases to be handled under the foreign relations power.253  
Because foreign relations are political affairs under the jurisdiction of the 
executive branch, courts must defer internally on these matters.254  Courts 
often discuss these issues when they consider whether the case presents a 
 
 250.  See Gray v Minister for Planning [2006] NSWLEC 720 (Unreported, Pain J, Nov. 27, 2006), 
¶¶ 146, 152 (holding that the assessment was void, which meant that the Director-General had to make 
a new assessment in compliance with the legal requirements). 
 251.  See Matthew L. Wald, Court Backs E.P.A. over Emissions Limits Intended to Reduce Global 
Warming, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/science/earth/epa-
emissions-rules-backed-by-court.html (discussing EPA findings and related rules setting limits on GHG 
emissions in the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA). 
 252.  See Michaels, supra note 9, at 19–20 (providing the groundwork for these statements by 
comparing domestic U.S. courts to international courts). 
 253.  Id. at 3 (describing how the U.S. administration has asked courts to dismiss international 
cases because they disturb foreign relations). 
 254.  See RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDER 9 (1964) (discussing the internal function of deference to transfer disputes to the foreign office). 
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nonjusticiable political question, as in Kivalina.255  If it does, then courts 
cannot adjudicate.256  This transfer of responsibility from courts to 
executives, however, is only appropriate in certain cases where the 
executive has superior means to address the issue.  For example, “the 
executive has a flexibility in the negotiating context that enables 
consideration of special circumstances, whereas the judiciary is confined 
by craft and by tradition to a narrow definition of the legal problem.”257  
While this may be true, when the judiciary is within its proper bounds there 
is no reason why it cannot adjudicate the problem rather than deferring it.  
For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court readily affirmed that it had the right 
to adjudicate in Massachusetts v. EPA because “[the] case suffers from 
none of the[] defects” that would have precluded it from being considered a 
justiciable controversy under Article III.258 Additionally, “[t]he parties’ 
dispute turns on the proper construction of a congressional statute, a 
question eminently suitable to resolution in federal court.”259  When this is 
the case, courts are legitimate forums vis-à-vis other domestic institutions. 
Externally, if foreign entities disagree with the laws, doctrines, or 
legal systems of local courts, they may oppose adjudication in those 
forums.  For instance, while the United States technically owes deference 
to foreign nations by way of international comity,260 U.S. courts have 
replaced international law with domestic law when serving as global 
appeals courts for matters of human rights.  Nations who oppose the U.S. 
system or relevant U.S. laws but feel the effects of the ruling may oppose 
the role taken by U.S. courts.261 
Yet, to the extent that existing doctrines are applicable, there is no real 
reason courts should not use the doctrinal tools at their disposal to address 
climate change.  If the legislature has enacted a statute related to climate 
change, then courts can interpret that statute, as in Massachusetts v. EPA.  
If the statute or regulation has created a procedural right, then courts can 
 
 255.  See supra note 158. 
 256.  Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 871 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(citing Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 980 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 257.  FALK, supra note 254, at 9. 
 258.  549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007). 
 259.  Id. 
 260.  See FALK, supra note 254, at 9 (discussing deference in external relations).  This deference 
preserves the special character of international law and its place in a global system marked by 
“jurisdictional rules for a social system that is both decentralized and divided.”  Id. 
 261.  See Michaels, supra note 9, at 2–3 (explaining that Europeans reject the tendency of U.S. 
courts to hear claims by foreign parties based on foreign events and yet apply U.S. law, specifically in 
the context of human rights). 
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adjudicate claims brought by particular plaintiffs,262 as was the 
circumstance in Watson.  Finally, if the legislative or executive body has 
mandated that an administrative agency create regulations related to 
climate change, as the Court held in Massachusetts v. EPA, then, assuming 
the regulation does not preclude judicial review, courts can ensure that 
agencies are held accountable for their final decisions.263  When these 
situations occur, local courts can use existing judicial doctrine to assess 
claims instead of deferring to other institutions.  They retain legitimacy by 
remaining within their doctrinal and judicial bounds, while taking part in 
solving a global problem. 
c. Capacity 
Within these bounds, local courts have the capacity to address global 
problems.  One local court ruling on one local land use case may have 
minimal impact on overall GHG emissions, but, cumulatively, local courts 
ruling on statutes pertaining to local environmental impact and forcing 
local agencies to properly perform environmental assessments has a 
“substantial impact on greenhouse gas production.”264  In these local cases, 
courts use the doctrines at their disposal to reach the global problem.  Since 
the doctrines that local courts use developed in response to traditional 
localized problems—involving localized parties and discrete 
jurisdictions—they do not always accommodate global problems like 
climate change.  Kivalina demonstrates that traditional standing 
requirements make it nearly impossible to establish causation because the 
available theories do not accommodate the cumulative nature of climate 
change. 
In the face of globalization, courts could transform such doctrines by 
expanding their application to accommodate climate change.  For instance, 
the courts in Massachusetts v. EPA struggled with how to define injury in 
the context of climate change until the Supreme Court disaggregated the 
global nature of climate change from the particular injuries that result.265 
Alternatively, courts could accept limitations under existing doctrine as 
appropriate.  The Australian court in Wildlife Whitsunday could not link 
 
 262.  See Fla. Audubon Soc. v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (discussing standing in 
procedural rights cases). 
 263.  See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990)) (explaining the 
requirement that plaintiffs only challenge final agency action so that courts do not pervasively monitor 
the day-to-day decisions of administrative agencies). 
 264.  Trisolini & Zasloff, supra note 30, at 73. 
 265.  See 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007) (explaining that Massachusetts had a concrete injury despite the 
fact that the harms of climate change are widely shared). 
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coal mine emissions of GHGs to environmental injury to a protected matter 
under the direct and indirect effects test.  Following a different approach, 
there could be a call for new, more adequate legislation.  For example, the 
EP&A Act and the accompanying ESD principles from Gray are 
significantly more suited to the global phenomenon of climate change.  No 
matter the approach, applicable doctrines define limits, creating an arena in 
which local courts have the capacity to address climate change and become 
part of the solution to the global problem. 
CONCLUSION 
The most successful climate change litigation to date involves 
requirements under climate change legislation.  Since one of the essential 
roles of courts is interpretation of statutes or applicable standards under 
such statutes, courts are appropriate forums in these cases.  Functionally, 
they have doctrines for judicial analysis, possess compliance mechanisms, 
and are accessible to litigants.  When courts stay within their established 
judicial role, they owe no internal or external deference and thus possess 
legitimacy.  Finally, the existence of applicable doctrine and judicially 
manageable standards also gives them the capacity to handle the claims. 
Still, the courts’ ability to adjudicate is based on plaintiffs having 
standing to bring a suit in court.  In the United States, standing requires 
injury, causation, and redressability.  Given the conceptual difficulty of 
applying climate change to this construct, cases in which the plaintiff has 
had some special status or procedural right and that have involved an 
administrative institution rather than a private defendant have been the 
most successful.  States, for example, can sue parens patriae, as in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.  Similarly, plaintiffs suing under a procedural right 
have relaxed causation and redressability standards, as in Watson.  Notably, 
these cases, as well as the Australian cases discussed, involve courts ruling 
on or against administrative agencies and their decisions, rather than 
private defendants. The key factors for success include relaxed standards 
that enable courts to more easily fit climate change into existing doctrine 
and a court’s inherent ability to hear and solve legal questions, such as 
through statutory interpretation or judicial review of administrative 
decisions.  When those powers coincide with a global problem like climate 
change, courts are prepared to adjudicate.  Without these special 
circumstances, however, many claims fail on injury, causation, or 
redressability, as in Kivalina. 
Local courts are limited not by the global nature of the problems but 
by the way in which a discrete case fits into existing doctrine and 
established judicial limits.  Thus, to the extent there are relevant 
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regulations, enforceable mandates, or applicable doctrines, courts can 
address global climate change.  Consequently, doctrine enables local courts 
to address global problems and to be catalysts for solving climate change. 
 
